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Abstract—Modern SoCs are heterogeneous parallel systems
comprised of components developed by distinct teams and
possibly even different vendors. The memory consistency model
(MCM) of processors in such SoCs specifies the ordering rules
which constrain the values that can be read by load instructions in
parallel programs running on such systems. The implementation
of required MCM orderings can span components which may be
designed and implemented by many different teams. Ideally, each
team would be able to specify the orderings enforced by their
components independently and then connect them together when
conducting MCM verification. However, no prior automated
approach for formal hardware MCM verification provided this.
To bring automated hardware MCM verification in line with
the realities of the design process, we present RealityCheck, a
methodology and tool for automated formal MCM verification of
modular microarchitectural ordering specifications. RealityCheck
allows users to specify their designs as a hierarchy of distinct
modules connected to each other rather than a single flat spec-
ification. It can then automatically verify litmus test programs
against these modular specifications. RealityCheck also provides
support for abstraction, which enables scalable verification by
breaking up the verification of the entire design into smaller
verification problems. We present results for verifying litmus
tests on 7 different designs using RealityCheck. These include
in-order and out-of-order pipelines, a non-blocking cache, and
a heterogeneous processor. Our case studies cover the TSO
and RISC-V (RVWMO) weak memory models. RealityCheck is
capable of verifying 98 RVWMO litmus tests in under 4 minutes
each, and its capability for abstraction enables up to a 32.1%
reduction in litmus test verification time for RVWMO.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s systems-on-chip (SoCs) are complex heterogeneous
systems developed by many individuals. Hardware development
of the processors used in these SoCs is divided up among
different teams, with each team responsible for one or a few
components. For instance, one team may be responsible for
the pipeline, another for the store buffer, a third for the L1
caches, and a fourth for an accelerator. Each team will have
detailed knowledge about the components they design, but may
know little about other components. Nevertheless, a processor
or SoC created by the interconnection of various components
developed by different teams must function correctly.
One measure of the correctness of a processor is its
conformance to its memory consistency model (MCM). MCMs
consist of rules which constrain the values that can be read by
load instructions in parallel programs [1]. An ISA-level MCM
like that of x86 [14] serves as both a target for compilers as
well as a specification that microarchitectures must implement.
If a microarchitecture does not obey the MCM of its ISA, then
parallel code compiled to target that ISA will not run correctly
on the hardware. MCM bugs have been discovered in hardware
in recent years [8, 11, 17, 22, 34], and will continue to increase
as designs become more complex and parallelism becomes
ubiquitous. This makes microarchitectural MCM verification
critical to parallel system correctness. There has been much
work in recent years on formal MCM specifications of hardware
ISAs [25, 26, 28, 32], as well as work on automatically formally
verifying that hardware implementations correctly implement
those MCMs [17, 18, 21–23, 32]. However, all of these prior
automated approaches suffer from deficiencies which put them
at odds with the realities of the processor design cycle. Figure 1
shows a graphical depiction of some of these deficiencies.
Prior automated formal approaches provide flat verification
(Figure 1a). There is no way for users to encapsulate component
functionality into a unit whose properties only apply to that unit,
or to verify a component independently of the rest of the system.
In other words, there is no support for modularity as shown in
Figure 1b. Similarly, users could not build larger modules from
smaller ones as there was no support for hierarchy. Figure 1c
shows an example of hierarchy where the L1 and Main Memory
modules reside within the MemoryHierarchy module.
Prior work also has no support for abstraction. In other
words, there is no way for users to decouple the specification
of their component’s external behaviour from the specification
of its implementation. As an example of abstraction, Figure 1d
represents the MemoryHierarchy using an abstract interface
AtomicMemory. AtomicMemory specifies the external-
facing behaviour of the memory hierarchy, but says nothing
about the internal implementation, like how many caches there
are. Abstraction facilitates scalable verification by breaking up
verification into smaller problems, as this paper shows.
Due to their lack of modularity, prior automated approaches
also suffer from a prevalence of omniscient or global prop-
erties in their design specifications. For example, a property
guaranteed by most shared-memory systems today is that of
coherence [29]. At an instruction level, coherence requires that
there exists a total order on all stores to the same address that
is respected by all cores in the system. However, hardware
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Fig. 1. Illustration of adding modularity, hierarchy, and abstraction to a flat design specification.
implementations of coherence use distributed protocols where
each cache (and often a bus/directory) is responsible for
enforcing part of the orderings required. None of the hardware
components in such an implementation has omniscient visibility
of the entire processor, and none of them can make statements
about the global behaviour of the system. Thus, global
properties such as the coherence definition above reflect a
designer’s abstraction of the hardware rather than what the
hardware is actually doing. If this abstraction is inaccurate,
verification using such a specification will be unsound.
To address these deficiencies of prior automated formal hard-
ware MCM verification approaches, we present RealityCheck,
a methodology and tool for automated formal MCM verifi-
cation which supports modularity, hierarchy, and abstraction.
RealityCheck allows users to specify their design as a hierarchy
of distinct modules connected to each other, closely matching
the structure of real hardware implementations. RealityCheck
can then automatically verify whether the composition of the
various modules exhibits behaviours forbidden by the ISA-level
MCM of the processor through bounded verification for suites
of litmus test programs. RealityCheck also lets users write
interface specifications of the external behaviour of components;
it can then verify component implementation specifications
against these interfaces. The use of such abstraction allows
a design to be verified piece-by-piece, enabling scalable
automated microarchitectural MCM verification.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• A Modular Microarchitectural Ordering Specification
Language: RealityCheck develops µspec++, the first
domain-specific language for hierarchical modular specifi-
cations of microarchitectural orderings. µspec++ extends
the µspec domain-specific language from prior work [18]
to incorporate modularity, hierarchy, and abstraction.
• Automated MCM Verification of Modular Design
Specifications: RealityCheck is the first framework for
hierarchical modular specification of hardware orderings
that enables automated verification of these specifications
against ISA-level MCMs for litmus test1 suites.
• Scalable Automated Microarchitectural MCM Verifi-
cation: RealityCheck is the first automated approach to
enable hierarchical MCM verification of a hardware design
piece-by-piece. It breaks down verification of the entire
design into smaller verification problems.
1A litmus test is a small program (usually 4-8 instructions long) used to
test MCM specifications and implementations.
Core 0 Core 1
(i1) [x] ← 1 (i3) [y] ← 1
(i2) r1 ← [y] (i4) r2 ← [x]
SC forbids r1=0, r2=0
Fig. 2. Code for litmus test sb
i3 i4
IF
EX
WB
L1ViCL_C
L1ViCL_E
i1 i2
Fig. 3. Example µhb graph for sb litmus test on Figure 1b’s processor.
• Demonstration: This paper culminates in the demonstra-
tion of RealityCheck’s capabilities through its application
on multiple modular processor/memory designs. These
include both in-order and out-of-order pipelines, a non-
blocking cache, and a heterogeneous processor. Our case
studies also cover the TSO and RISC-V (RVWMO) [27]
weak memory models.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A. Automated Microarchitectural MCM Verification
The simplest and most intuitive MCM is sequential con-
sistency (SC) [16]. SC defines correct executions as those in
which results are consistent with some total order on all memory
operations across all cores, in addition to each core performing
its operations in program order. To illustrate MCM analysis,
consider the store buffering (sb) litmus test in Figure 2.
Initially, both addresses x and y are 0 by convention. Core 0
sets its flag x and reads the value of core 1’s flag y. Meanwhile,
core 1 sets its flag y and reads the value of core 0’s flag x.
Under SC, it is forbidden for both loads to return 0, as there is
no total order on all memory operations that would allow this.
Consider the execution of sb on the microarchitecture
represented by Figure 1b (henceforth called exampleProc).
Assume that each core has 3-stage in-order pipelines of Fetch
(IF), Execute (EX), and Writeback (WB) stages, and that
the processor aims to implement SC. Prior automated formal
MCM verification approaches [17, 18, 21–23, 32] modelled
microarchitectural executions as µhb or microarchitectural
happens-before graphs [17], where nodes represent sub-events
in the execution of instructions and edges represent happens-
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Axiom "Read_Initial":
forall microop "i", forall microop "j",
IsAnyRead i /\ DataFromInitialState i /\
IsAnyWrite j /\ SameAddress i j =>
AddEdge((i,L1ViCL_E),(j,L1ViCL_C),"").
Fig. 4. Example µspec axiom.
before relationships between nodes. Figure 3 shows a µhb
graph depicting the execution of sb on exampleProc for
the outcome where both loads return 0. Each column in
the graph represents the path of one litmus test instruction
through the microarchitecture, and each row represents the
nodes corresponding to one type of event being modelled. So
for instance, the node in the second row and first column of the
graph represents instruction i1 at its Execute stage, while
the node in the second row and second column represents
instruction i2 at its Execute stage.
Edges in µhb graphs represent happens-before relationships
between nodes, and correspond to the various orderings the
microarchitecture enforces. e.g. the blue edge between the
Execute stages of i1 and i2 indicates that i1 goes through
Execute before i2 does, as required of an in-order pipeline.
The last two rows in the µhb graph (L1ViCL_C and
L1ViCL_E) use the ViCL (Value in Cache Lifetime) ab-
straction to model cache occupancy and coherence protocol
events relevant to MCM verification. Briefly speaking, a ViCL
represents the period of time (relative to a single cache or main
memory) over which a given cache/memory line provides a
specific value for a specific address. The time period referenced
by a ViCL begins at a ViCL Create event, and ends at a ViCL
Expire event. Figure 3 uses L1ViCL_C and L1ViCL_E to
refer to ViCL Create and ViCL Expire events respectively,
for the L1 caches in exampleProc. We refer the reader to
CCICheck [23] for further details.
µhb graphs can be constructed based on microarchitectural
specifications that dictate when and where nodes and edges
should be added for a given program. Prior work specified
microarchitectural orderings as a set of axioms in the domain-
specific µspec language [18], which is similar to first-order
logic. Figure 4 shows an example µspec axiom. This ax-
iom enforces that for every microop i (a microop is a
single load or store), if it is a load (enforced through the
IsAnyRead predicate) that reads from the initial state of
memory (DataFromInitialState i), then its L1 ViCL
must expire before the creation of L1 ViCLs of any write j to
that address, as the write would have caused the invalidation
of all other cache lines for that address. The loads i2 and
i4 in sb both read from the initial state, so this axiom
adds the red edges in Figure 3 to enforce the expiration of
their ViCLs before the creation of ViCLs for stores i3 and
i1 respectively. µspec supports both forall and exists
quantifiers. forall quantifiers are translated to ANDs over the
litmus test instructions, while exists quantifiers are translated
to ORs over the litmus test instructions.
Other axioms for exampleProc would enforce that a given
read or write goes through the pipeline stages in order, and
that instructions on the same core (like i1 and i2) proceed
through a given pipeline stage in program order (blue edges
in Figure 3). Another axiom would enforce that a write must
create its L1 ViCL (i.e. reach the memory hierarchy) before
subsequent loads execute (in order to maintain program order
as required by SC), shown by the yellow edges in Figure 3.
A cycle in a µhb graph implies that an event must happen
before itself, which is impossible. Thus, cyclic µhb graphs
correspond to executions that are unobservable on the target
microarchitecture. Likewise, acyclic µhb graphs correspond to
executions that are observable on the target microarchitecture.
Figure 3’s µhb graph is cyclic (the edges that comprise the
cycle are bolded), and thus this execution is unobservable on
exampleProc, as required of an SC microarchitecture.
Typically, there are multiple µhb graphs for a given litmus
test and microarchitecture. These correspond to different
possible event orderings. To automatically verify a given
litmus test on a microarchitecture, prior work uses SMT [4]
solvers to search for an acyclic µhb graph that satisfies all
µspec axioms. If such a graph is found, the litmus test is
observable on the microarchitecture, while if no such graph can
be found, the litmus test is guaranteed to be unobservable on the
microarchitecture. The microarchitectural observability of the
litmus test is then compared to ISA-level MCM requirements.
In particular, if the observable litmus test is forbidden by the
ISA-level MCM, then the microarchitecture is buggy.
B. Deficiencies of Prior Automated Approaches
1) No Scoping of Axioms: The flat verification conducted
by prior automated microarchitectural MCM verification ap-
proaches encourages the use of axioms which exercise a global
view of the entire processor. For instance, Figure 4’s axiom
adds µhb edges between ViCLs of Core 0’s L1 and Core 1’s L1
in Figure 3 to reflect that the loads must read memory before
the stores invalidate their cache lines through the coherence
protocol. While this axiom is straightforward to write and
would be valid in a coherent memory hierarchy, it does not
correspond to what the hardware is actually doing, because no
single hardware component has global visibility of the entire
processor. For example, in Figure 1b’s processor, Core 0’s
L1 can observe the values in its own cache, but it cannot see
the values in Core 1’s L1. Each component in a hardware
design can only enforce orderings on the events that it sees.
The ordering in Figure 4’s axiom is actually enforced in a
distributed manner by a combination of modules, specifically
the L1s and (likely) a bus or directory. An architect may
surmise that the combination of the orderings enforced by the
L1s and bus/directory is sufficient to enforce Figure 4’s axiom,
but such an assumption must be validated before using the
axiom for microarchitectural MCM verification. Otherwise it
is possible that the axiom does not hold in the actual hardware
design, leading to unsound verification. A better approach is
to allow the teams working on each module to specify the
axioms that actually hold in their modules, and then verify that
the composition of the modules correctly maintains required
MCM orderings. However, all axioms in prior work have global
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visibility. There is no way for users to write axioms that are
scoped to one portion of the design.
2) No Per-Module or Scalable Verification: Prior automated
MCM verification approaches also provided no way for users to
verify a component independently of the rest of the system. For
instance, all verification in Figure 3’s µhb graph is conducted
in terms of instructions, relative to an ISA-level litmus test.
There is no way to verify say, the L1 caches individually. Since
prior work can only verify a design all at once, it cannot scale
to large detailed designs due to the exponential complexity
of SMT solving [4]. Ideally, each component would have an
interface specification that it could be verified against, and it
would be possible to verify a design piece-by-piece, allowing
verification to scale to large detailed designs.
RealityCheck solves the above problems through its approach
to modularity, hierarchy, and abstraction. The next section
provides a high-level overview of how it does so.
III. REALITYCHECK OVERVIEW
Figure 5 shows the high-level block diagram of RealityCheck.
RealityCheck can be run in one of two ways: (i) for litmus
test verification to verify a modular microarchitectural ordering
specification against an ISA-level litmus test, or (ii) for interface
verification to verify the microarchitectural ordering specifica-
tion of design components against the ordering specification of
their abstract interfaces (Section IV). The latter use case enables
a module to be verified independently of the rest of the design.
The five steps in RealityCheck operation (Microarchitecture
Tree Generation, Operation Assignment, Formula Genera-
tion, Translation to Z3, and Graph Generation) are common
to both litmus test verification and interface verification. The
difference between the two cases lies in which modules are
checked and which operations they are checked on. Operations
represent the instructions or instruction-like quantities that a
module operates on. For example, the operations of a core
module would be instructions, but the operations of a memory
module would be memory transactions. Figure 6 provides a
high-level graphical depiction of RealityCheck’s basic terms
(including operations) for Figure 1c’s processor.
Two inputs that are provided to RealityCheck in both litmus
test verification and interface verification are the implemen-
tation axiom files and the module definition files. These files
are specified in the µspec++ language (Section V) developed
as part of RealityCheck. The µspec++ language is based on
the µspec language [18], but adds support to the language for
modularity, hierarchy, and abstraction, much like C++ does to
C. The module definition files (Section V-B) specify µspec++
modules in a manner similar to a C++ .h file. Meanwhile,
each implementation axiom file (Section V-A) specifies the
events relevant to a given module as well as orderings on these
events, in a manner similar to a C++ .cpp file.
If verifying a litmus test, the test is provided as input
in the .test format from prior work [18]. Meanwhile, if
running interface verification, RealityCheck takes in a list of
implementation-interface pairs. Each pair specifies an imple-
mentation module to verify against an interface specification,
and their corresponding node mappings (Section V-D).
The final input to RealityCheck (which is always provided
to the tool) is the bound up to which to conduct verification.
Similar to most prior automated hardware MCM verification
work [17, 18, 22, 23, 32] but unlike PipeProof [21], Real-
ityCheck conducts bounded verification; i.e. it explores all
possible executions that use up to the specified number of
operations (per module). Thus, RealityCheck is excellent for
bug-finding, as we show in our case studies in Section VIII-D.
IV. ABSTRACTION AND ITS BENEFITS
In RealityCheck, interfaces can be used to separate the
specification of a component’s functional behaviour from the
details of its implementation. For example, users may want to
abstract the behaviour of their memory hierarchy as a single
atomic memory, as shown in Figure 7.
The use of interfaces has several benefits. First, any imple-
mentation of the interface can be verified against the interface
specification independently of the rest of the system. This
gives users a method to verify the correctness of a design
component without needing to link it to a top-level litmus
test. For example, Figure 7 shows the verification of the
MemoryHierarchy module and its submodules (instances of
other modules that exist within MemoryHierarchy) against
the AtomicMemory interface. Interface verification enables
easy localisation of bugs to a given module based on whether
it satisfies its interface. Second, interfaces enable scalable
verification. Instead of verifying the entire design at once
(Figure 1c), which will likely result in an SMT formula too
large for solvers to handle, interfaces enable verification to be
split into multiple steps. Specifically, the design is first verified
using the (likely) smaller and simpler interface specification
of the component (Figure 1d) rather than its implementation.
Then, the component implementation is separately verified
against the interface specification up to a user-provided bound
(Figure 7). These two verification queries can be run in parallel,
and will likely be smaller SMT formulae than verifying the
design all at once. This process can be repeated further down
the hierarchy. For instance, if the L1 caches in Figure 7 had
interfaces, those interfaces could be used when conducting
interface verification in Figure 7. The L1 implementation could
then be separately verified against its interface specification.
This splitting of verification queries using interfaces can be
done again and again to split verification into smaller problems,
thus allowing it to scale.
Third, interfaces allow implementations to be switched in
and out easily. For example, if the user wants to introduce a
new memory hierarchy (say, one with an L2) to a previously
verified version of Figure 1d, then all they need to do to ensure
correctness is to verify the new memory hierarchy against the
AtomicMemory interface, independently of the rest of the
design. Finally, the use of interfaces facilitates sharing of IP
between vendors at the SoC level. A vendor can internally
verify their implementation against its interface for correctness,
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and then share their interface with other vendors without having
to share their internal implementation specification.
V. µSPEC++ MODULAR DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS
This section explains the µspec++ domain-specific language
using a pedagogical microarchitecture simpleProc, com-
prised of 3-stage pipelines connected to a single main memory.
A. Implementation Axiom Files
Each implementation axiom file specifies the events relevant
to a given module. Figure 8 shows part of the implementation
axiom file for a module of type Core. The file begins with
the module’s type, and is followed by a list of the types of
events that this module can observe and/or enforce orderings on,
denoted using DefineEvent. The rest of the file details the
axioms which enforce orderings on these events. Figure 8
shows two such axioms, PO_Fetch and Req_Resp_PO.
These axioms are identical to µspec axioms, except that their
scope is restricted to the operations of the module in which
they are declared. For example, if evaluating Figure 2’s litmus
test on a µspec++ design, an instance of the Core module
representing Core 0 would only be able to see instructions i1
and i2 rather than all the instructions of the test. In such a
ModuleID "Core".
DefineEvent 0 "IF".
DefineEvent 1 "EX".
DefineEvent 2 "WB".
DefineEvent External 3 "MemReq".
DefineEvent External 4 "MemResp".
Axiom "PO_Fetch":
forall microop "i1",
forall microop "i2",
ProgramOrder i1 i2 =>
AddEdge ((i1, IF), (i2, IF), "").
Axiom "Req_Resp_PO":
forall microop "i1",
forall microop "i2",
EdgeExists ((i1, WB), (i2, WB), "") /\
NodesExist [(i1, MemResp); (i2, MemReq)] =>
AddEdge ((i1, MemResp), (i2, MemReq),"").
Fig. 8. Part of simpleProc’s Core module’s implementation axiom file.
case, the forall quantifiers in the PO_Fetch axiom would
evaluate to an AND over instructions i1 and i2.
By default, events can only be viewed by the module instance
in which they are declared, similar to private member variables
in C++. For example, the IF and WB events in an instance of
the Core module cannot be seen outside that Core instance.
This capability allows designers to hide events internal to their
design component from other modules in the system, just like
in a real Verilog design.
Meanwhile, a module’s external events can be viewed by
itself as well as by its parent module and any modules it may
be connected to (see Section V-B for further details). Such
events are labelled with the External keyword when they
are declared in the implementation axiom file. For example, the
MemReq and MemResp events in Figure 8’s Core module are
both external events. Thus, if the Req_Resp_PO axiom adds
an edge between the MemResp and MemReq nodes of two
instructions, that edge will be visible outside the instance of the
Core module in which the instructions reside. Figure 6 shows
a graphical depiction of internal and external events/nodes.
B. Module Definition Files
Figure 9 shows the module definition of simpleProc’s top-
level Processor module. A module definition file specifies
the module’s operation type, properties, submodules, and
connection axioms.
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Module Processor () {
OperationType none
Properties { IsCore no }
Submodules {
Core c0 (c : 0)
Core c1 (c : 1)
Core c2 (c : 2)
Core c3 (c : 3)
Mem mem ()
}
ConnectionAxioms {
Axiom "instr_has_tran":
forall microop "i" in "c0;c1;c2;c3",
NodeExists (i, MemReq) =>
exists transaction "j" in "mem",
Mapped i j.
...
Axiom "mapped_effects":
forall microop "i" in "c0;c1;c2;c3",
forall transaction "j" in "mem",
Mapped i j =>
(SameAddress i j /\ SameData i j /\
(IsAnyRead i <=> IsAnyRead j) /\
(IsAnyWrite i <=> IsAnyWrite j) /\
SameNode (i, MemReq) (j, Req) /\
SameNode (i, MemResp) (j, Resp)).
}}
Fig. 9. simpleProc’s Processor module definition.
Axiom "Mem_Writes_Path":
forall transaction "i",
NodeExists (i, Req) /\ IsAnyWrite i =>
AddEdges [((i, Req), (i, ViCL_C), "");
((i, ViCL_C), (i, ViCL_E), "");
((i, ViCL_C), (i, Resp), "")].
Fig. 10. An implementation axiom of simpleProc’s Mem.
1) Operation Types and Properties: The operations in each
module have some type, specified using the OperationType
keyword. For example, simpleProc’s Core module has
an operation type of microop, since it deals with in-
structions, while the Mem module has an operation type of
transaction. Users can add additional operation types.
The Processor module in Figure 9 has an operation type of
none, a special identifier indicating that it has no operations.
This is because the Processor module serves only to
encapsulate the other modules in the system.
When quantifying over operations, RealityCheck verifies
that the operation type used in the quantifier matches that
of the operations over which the quantifier is being eval-
uated. So for instance, if the first forall quantifier in
Figure 8’s PO_Fetch axiom was replaced with forall
transaction "i1", RealityCheck would flag a type error.
A module’s properties are certain fields that are shared across
all instances of the module, similar to static variables of classes
in C++. An example of a property is the IsCore property,
which can be set to yes or no.
2) Submodules: The submodules of a module are instances
of other modules that exist within it. Submodules enable
hierarchy in RealityCheck, allowing larger modules to be built
using smaller ones. A module can evaluate µspec++ predicates
(a)
(b)
IF
EX
WB
MemReq
MemResp
i1 i2
IF
EX
WB
MemReq/
Req
ViCL_C
ViCL_E
MemResp/
Resp
(c)
i1 i2
t1 t2
Req
ViCL_C
ViCL_E
Resp
t1 t2
Fig. 11. Effect of connection axioms in simpleProc, assuming 3-stage
pipelines. (a) shows two stores in program order from a Core, while (b) shows
two transactions from Mem. (c) shows the result when connection axioms merge
the MemReq and MemResp nodes of Core with the Req and Resp nodes
of Mem. Black nodes are internal nodes while red and blue nodes are external
nodes. Dotted nodes and edges are not guaranteed to exist. Merged nodes are
concentric circles.
on the operations of its submodules and observe their external
events, but it cannot observe their internal events.
When instantiating a submodule, parameters may be passed
to the instance to populate some instance-specific fields (similar
to C++ constructors). For example, when the Processor
module instantiates Core modules as its submodules, it passes
each of them an integer parameter c denoting their core ID.
This parameter can then be used in the axioms of that module.
3) Connection Axioms: Submodules are connected to each
other and to their parent module through connection axioms.
The bottom of Figure 9 shows two example connection axioms.
Connection axioms are similar to implementation axioms
(Section V-A), but have differences in their scope. A module’s
connection axioms can observe the operations of the module
itself and those of its submodules. They can observe all events
of their module (both internal and external), but only the
external events of any submodules.
Since connection axioms can observe the operations of
multiple modules, their quantifiers must specify the domain
over which they operate. Each quantifier provides a list of
modules whose operations it applies to (this refers to the
operations of the module itself). For example, the forall
quantifier in the instr_has_tran axiom is evaluated on
the operations from modules c0, c1, c2, and c3. Thus, the
quantifier evaluates to an AND over all these operations, but
6
does not apply to the operations in the mem module.
Connection axioms are responsible for translating one
module’s operations to those of another, and for linking them
together. For example, if a core is connected to memory, the
core’s instructions need to be translated and mapped to their
corresponding memory transactions. Furthermore, there may
be multiple possible translations for a given litmus test. e.g. a
load may read from the store buffer in one execution (and thus
generate no memory transactions), while in another execution it
may read from memory, thus generating a memory transaction.
By checking all the different ways the connection axioms
could be satisfied, RealityCheck examines all possible trans-
lations of operations between modules. For example, the
instr_has_tran axiom in Figure 9 maps each instruction
on the four cores which requests data from memory (signified
by the existence of its external MemReq node) to some
transaction in mem, denoted by the Mapped predicate. This
reflects how in a real design, an instruction in the pipeline
that accesses memory will generate a corresponding memory
transaction. Other axioms not shown ensure that the mapping
between instructions and memory transactions is 1-1. Mapping
schemes other than 1-1 can be used where necessary.
If operations are mapped to each other 1-1, mapped pairs
must agree on which addresses, values, etc are being accessed.
They must also agree on the timing of their events. For
example, the second connection axiom (mapped_effects)
in Figure 9 enforces some of these orderings. It enforces that
if an instruction is mapped to a memory transaction, then
they must have the same address and read/write the same
data value. It also enforces that load instructions map to read
transactions and stores map to write transactions (through the
IsAnyRead and IsAnyWrite predicates). In addition, it
uses the SameNode predicate to link the MemReq event of the
instruction i to the Req event of the transaction j. Likewise,
the MemResp event of i is linked to the Resp event of j.
Linking two nodes with SameNode essentially merges the
two nodes together, ensuring that they are exactly the same
event. In this case, the processor’s request to and response
from memory are viewed from the memory side as an arriving
request to which it sends a response. Further details about the
semantics of SameNode are discussed in Section VI-D.
4) A Graphical Example: Figure 11 graphically depicts the
effect of connection axioms in simpleProc. Black outlines
denote internal nodes. External nodes are outlined in blue (in
Core) or red (in Mem). In Figure 11a we have two stores i1
and i2 in program order from an instance of Core. Note that
the MemResp nodes of i1 and i2 are dotted to indicate that
these nodes are not guaranteed to exist. This reflects the fact
that a Core cannot just assume that its memory requests will
be responded to. The existence of the MemResp nodes must
be enforced by axioms in the Mem module and communicated
to the Core through connection axioms. The implementation
axioms of the Core module in Figure 8 obey this convention;
for instance, the Req_Resp_PO axiom does not add an edge
between the MemResp event of i1 and the MemReq event of
i2 unless the MemResp node of i1 exists.
Meanwhile, in Figure 11b we have two memory transactions
t1 and t2, governed by the axioms of the Mem module –
specifically, the axiom shown in Figure 10. This axiom enforces
that if a write request is provided to the Mem module, then it is
responded to. Note that all the nodes of t1 and t2 are dotted,
indicating that none of them are guaranteed to exist. This
reflects the fact that in simpleProc, memory will remain
idle unless data is provided to or requested from it. Without
connection axioms, no instructions must interact with memory,
and so no nodes or edges in Mem are guaranteed to exist.
When the connection axioms in Figure 9 are enforced,
the result is Figure 11c, where instruction i1 is mapped to
transaction t1 and instruction i2 is mapped to transaction t2.
The Req node of transaction t1 is now guaranteed to exist,
because it is the same node as i1’s MemReq node (denoted
by the concentric blue and red circles), which is guaranteed
to exist by Core. Transaction t2’s Req node is similarly
guaranteed to exist by t2 being mapped to i2. Figure 10’s
axiom now enforces that both transactions are responded to,
causing the Resp nodes of t1 and t2 to exist, and thus also
causing the MemResp nodes of i1 and i2 to exist (since
they are now merged with the Resp nodes). Finally, since the
MemResp node of i1 now exists, the Req_Resp_PO axiom
of the Core module (Figure 8) now enforces (through the
orange edge in Figure 11) that the Core must receive i1’s
response from memory before sending i2’s request to memory.
C. Preventing Globally Scoped Axioms
Consider trying to include the globally scoped axiom from
Figure 4 in a RealityCheck specification for Figure 1c’s
processor. Figure 4’s axiom references L1 ViCL nodes, which
are internal to their corresponding L1 instance in the processor’s
module hierarchy. Thus, an axiom that references ViCL nodes
(like Figure 4) must be an internal axiom in the L1 module.
However, any internal axiom in an L1 module instance can
only observe its own transactions. For example, if evaluating
the litmus test sb (Figure 2), the internal axioms of Core
0’s L1 module can only see the memory transactions mapped
to i1 and i2. µspec++ provides no way for Core 0’s L1’s
internal axioms to refer to the memory transactions of i3
and i4. Similarly, Core 1’s L1 instance can observe the
memory transactions of i3 and i4, but not those of i1 and
i2. Thus, as an internal axiom in RealityCheck, Figure 4
cannot enforce Figure 3’s red edges between i2 and i3 or
between i4 and i1, because it cannot refer to either of these
pairs at the same time. Likewise, the internal or connection
axioms of the MemoryHierarchy module can refer to the
memory transactions of all litmus test instructions, but they
cannot refer to the internal ViCL nodes of the L1 modules
(RealityCheck will flag an error if they do so). Either way,
RealityCheck makes it impossible to write a single axiom that
accomplishes Figure 4’s functionality. The ordering must be
enforced by a combination of axioms: one or more connection
axioms to communicate coherence invalidations from one L1
to another, and another internal axiom in the L1 module
to process these invalidations and ensure that the ViCLs
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expire appropriately. Thus, if users organise their µspec++
specifications into modules that reflect the structure of their
design, RealityCheck will automatically prevent them from
writing globally scoped axioms that violate this design structure.
D. Interface Specification and Node Mappings
Interfaces are specified in RealityCheck in a manner sim-
ilar to other modules, but with some additional constraints.
Interfaces cannot have submodules or connection axioms, as
their goal is to provide a simple specification of component
behaviour that does not delve into implementation details.
When verifying an implementation against an interface, the
event types of the implementation must be mapped to those of
the interface, so that the interface’s properties can be checked
on the implementation. Otherwise the interface and implemen-
tation would be referring to different events. For example, if
verifying MemoryHierarchy against AtomicMemory as
per Figure 7, one might map the request and response events of
the memory hierarchy to the corresponding request and reponse
events of the atomic memory. This list of node mappings must
be provided along with a interface-implementation pair when
it is input to RealityCheck for interface verification.
VI. REALITYCHECK OPERATION
A. Step 1: Microarchitecture Tree Generation
Microarchitecture Tree Generation creates a tree of
µspec++ module instances (i.e. copies) according to the module
definition files and interface/implementation axiom files.
B. Step 2: Operation Assignment
Operation Assignment generates and assigns operations to
each module. The design’s axioms are subsequently evaluated
over these operations, with the visibility restrictions enforced
by µspec++ detailed earlier.
RealityCheck assigns a number of operations to each module
equal to the bound specified by the user as input. For instance,
if assigning operations to Figure 1b’s processor for a bound
of 4, there would be 4 operations assigned to each of the 4
cores, each of the L1s, and to main memory, for a total of 16
+ 16 + 4 = 36 operations for the entire design. The bound is
the maximum number of operations per module that can exist
in any verified execution, so an execution may use only some
of the operations per module. RealityCheck accomplishes this
by associating every operation with an implicit IsNotNull
predicate, and enforcing that axioms only apply to non-null
operations. This is the approach used by tools like Alloy [15].
In litmus test verification, the design’s Core modules
(identified by the IsCore property) are assigned the litmus
test instructions corresponding to their core. These litmus
test instructions are concrete; their type, address, and value
are dictated by the litmus test and cannot change. However,
as Section V-B3 covers, verification must cover all possible
translations (up to a bound) of these litmus test instructions to
lower-level modules. RealityCheck enables such translation by
having operations in modules other than cores be symbolic, and
having connection axioms enforce requirements on them based
on the instructions they are (directly or indirectly) mapped to.
Symbolic operations are abstract operations which can have
any type (e.g.: read, write, etc.), address, or value, as long as
the design’s axioms are maintained.
Meanwhile, in interface verification, all operations of in-
volved modules are symbolic. Thus, in that case, RealityCheck
verifies that an implementation satisfies its interface for all
possible combinations of operations up to the bound.
C. Step 3: Formula Generation
In Formula Generation, RealityCheck takes the conjunction
of every module’s implementation axioms and connection
axioms, eliminating quantifiers by translating foralls into
ANDs and exists into ORs over each quantifier’s domain
(the operations being quantified over). RealityCheck conducts
some preliminary simplification on the resultant representation,
and then converts it (as described below) into an SMT formula
checkable by the Z3 SMT solver [7].
D. Steps 4 & 5: Translate to Z3 and Graph Generation
RealityCheck translates AND, OR, and NOT operators
to their Z3 equivalents. Each predicate is mapped to a Z3
Boolean variable, except for SameNode (explained below).
RealityCheck uses Z3’s Linear Integer Arithmetic (LIA) theory
to enforce happens-before orders. Each µhb node has two
variables in Z3. The first is a Boolean variable dictating whether
or not the node exists. The second is an integer variable
denoting the timestamp of the node in the microarchitectural
execution. An edge from a node s to a node d is translated to
a constraint e_s < e_d where e_s and e_d are the integer
variables denoting the timestamps of s and d respectively.
The SameNode predicate requires special handling, as it
is not just a Boolean predicate, but also enforces that two
nodes be merged together. If the user declares two nodes
to be the same node in their µspec++, RealityCheck first
creates a bi-implication between their Boolean variables to
ensure that if one exists, so does the other (and vice versa).
Then, RealityCheck adds a constraint that the integer variables
denoting the timestamps of the nodes must have the same value.
Together, these two constraints ensure that the two nodes in
the SameNode predicate are treated as the same node.
If Z3 finds a satisfying assignment to the generated formula,
the assignment represents an acyclic graph where nodes with
their Boolean variables set to true exist, and where edges exist
between nodes s and d if the integer variable for s is less
than the integer variable for d. In such a case, RealityCheck
parses the satisyfing assignment to generate a µhb graph that
the user can view and use for debugging. If Z3 cannot find
a satisfying assignment, then no acyclic µhb graph satisfying
the constraints exists, and the outcome under consideration is
unobservable (up to the user-specified bound).
VII. REALITYCHECK USAGE FLOWS
RealityCheck may be used to verify a component against its
interface in isolation (Section IV), independent of the rest of
the design. This capability of per-module verification enables
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TABLE I
MICROARCHITECTURES EVALUATED USING REALITYCHECK
Name Pipelines Mem. Hierarchy MCM
simpleProc inOrderCore unifiedMem SC
cacheProc inOrderCore L1Hier SC
simpleProcTSO sbCore unifiedMem TSO
cacheProcTSO sbCore L1Hier TSO
simpleProcRISCV rvwmoCore unifiedMem RVWMO
cacheProcRISCV rvwmoCore L1Hier RVWMO
heteroProcRISCV 2 sbCore-RISCV,
2 rvwmoCore
L1Hier RVWMO
RealityCheck to adapt to multiple design flows. If used at
early-stage design time, users may first come up with a shallow
design specification where all modules are represented by their
interfaces, and then progressively replace modules with their
submodules and implementations to create a more detailed
design over time. Interface verification can be used to check
implementations for correctness as the design becomes more
detailed in this “outside-in” approach. If interface verification
finds bugs, then additional axioms should be added to the
implementation until interface verification succeeds.
On the other hand, if an implementation (or RTL) already
exists, users may favour an “inside-out” approach, where
they first model one or a few modules deep in the system,
and progressively add more modules and hierarchy to the
specification until the entire design is modelled. In the case
where RTL exists, users may use a tool like RTLCheck [22] to
check that the axioms they are writing for modules are sound.
When decomposing a module into submodules, users should
try and minimise communication between the submodules.
If such decomposition proves difficult, or would result in
submodules with minimal internal functionality and large
amounts of communication between them, it may be better
to leave the module as a single unit (i.e. no submodules).
The more internal events one can hide using abstraction, the
faster verification will be (generally speaking). So for instance,
RealityCheck will be fast for a microarchitecture that has a
simple request-response interface to memory where all other
memory functionality is hidden. Likewise, it will be slower for
a speculative microarchitecture where coherence invalidations
are propagated up to the pipeline. Nevertheless, RealityCheck
is still capable of verifying such microarchitectures.
VIII. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
A. Methodology
RealityCheck is written primarily in Gallina, the functional
programming language of Coq [30]. It also includes some
OCaml, specifically the code to translate µspec++ formulae
into Z3 using the Z3 OCaml API. RealityCheck builds on the
Check suite’s µspec parsing and axiom simplification [18],
adding support for the various µspec++ features discussed in
Section V. In contrast to prior work [18] that used a basic SMT
solver written in Gallina that supported µspec, RealityCheck
utilises the state-of-the-art Z3 SMT solver [7] to check its SMT
formulae. We extract our Gallina code to OCaml using Coq’s
Fig. 12. Verification times for 95 litmus tests across four microarchitectures
implementing the SC and TSO MCMs. Each column represents the runtimes
for the 95 tests for one particular configuration. The box represents the upper
and lower quartile range of the data. Dots represent points lying beyond 1.5x
the interquartile range (the extent of the whiskers) from the ends of the box.
Fig. 13. Verification times for 98 litmus tests across three microarchitectures
implementing the RISC-V RVWMO MCM.
built-in extraction functionality, and compile it and our OCaml
code along with Z3’s OCaml API into a standalone binary
that can call into Z3 to solve SMT formulae. Experiments
were run on an Ubuntu 18.04 machine with 4 Intel Xeon Gold
6230 processors (80 total cores) and 1 TB of RAM. Each run
of RealityCheck only utilises one core at time, but multiple
instances of it can be run in parallel.
B. Verifying Litmus Tests
Table I lists the 7 microarchitectures (each with 4 cores) on
which we ran RealityCheck. The first six microarchitectures
are comprised of the possible combinations of three pipelines
and two memory hierarchies. The three pipelines are: (i)
inOrderCore, an in-order 5-stage pipeline that performs
memory operations in program order, (ii) sbCore, an in-
order 5-stage pipeline with a store buffer from which it can
forward values, and (iii) rvwmoCore, an out-of-order RISC-V
pipeline which implements RISC-V’s RVWMO weak memory
model [27]. sbCore is capable of reordering writes with
subsequent reads, as allowed by TSO (Total Store Order), the
consistency model of Intel [14] and AMD x86 processors.
rvwmoCore is more relaxed; it allows any loads and stores to
different addresses to be reordered (in the absence of fences),
while preserving address, data, and control dependencies as
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Fig. 14. Runtimes for verifying L1Hier against AtomicMemory with
varying bounds. Low bounds (e.g. 3-4) are sufficient to find common bugs.
required by RVWMO. rvwmoCore supports coalescing of
stores in its store buffer, and also supports all 8 of the RISC-V
base ISA’s fences for ordering memory loads and stores. The
two memory hierarchies we model are unifiedMem, a single
unified memory, and L1Hier, which consists of an L1 cache
module backed by a module for a unified memory. The L1
cache in L1Hier is a non-blocking cache. It models requests
for data from main memory, cache occupancy, and coalescing
of stores before writing back to memory.
The final microarchitecture we evaluate RealityCheck on
is heteroProcRISCV, a heterogeneous RISC-V proces-
sor. heteroProcRISCV has 2 out-of-order rvwmoCore
pipelines and 2 in-order sbCore pipelines modified for the
RISC-V ISA. To modify sbCore for RISC-V, we changed it
to only enforce RISC-V fences that order writes with respect
to subsequent reads, and to treat all other fences as nops. This
is because the orderings enforced by other RISC-V fence types
are already maintained by sbCore by default.
We also created four interfaces: one for each pipeline
(inOrderInt, sbInt, and rvwmoInt) and one for the
L1Hier memory hierarchy (AtomicMemory). Pipeline in-
terfaces like inOrderInt reduce each pipeline module to
its requests to and responses from memory (and its depen-
dency orderings, in the case of rvwmoInt). Meanwhile,
AtomicMemory abstracts L1Hier as a unified memory.
These interfaces help verification scale as discussed below.
1) SC and TSO Results: Figure 12 shows RealityCheck’s
runtimes (as a box-and-whisker plot) for a suite of 95 SC/TSO
litmus tests on the four SC and TSO microarchitectures, both
with and without interfaces. These results use a bound of up
to 11 operations per module. The litmus tests in the SC/TSO
suite come from a variety of sources, including existing x86-
TSO suites [25] and automatically generated tests from the
diy tool [31]. As Figure 12 shows, RealityCheck’s verification
of litmus tests is quite fast, despite the increased detail of
its microarchitectural specifications when compared to prior
automated formal MCM verification. 92 of the 95 tests are
verified by all 8 configurations in under 4 minutes each.
The three remaining tests (co-iriw, n3, and iwp27) take
longer as they have a large number of instructions (e.g. n3
has 9 instructions) and/or possibilities to consider. However,
RealityCheck still verifies them under all configurations in less
TABLE II
INTERFACE VERIFICATION TIMES FOR PIPELINE MODULES (BOUND OF 15)
inOrderCore tsoCore riscvCore
< 1 sec. 18 sec. 42 minutes
than 14 minutes each.
Figure 12 also shows how the use of interfaces provides
significant reductions in overall litmus test verification runtime.
Pipeline interfaces and AtomicMemory can be used to
abstract away portions of each design for litmus test verification.
The use of abstraction reduces the total time to verify all litmus
tests by 24.2% for cacheProc, 0.6% for simpleProcTSO,
and 29.7% for cacheProcTSO. Meanwhile, the use of
abstraction increases runtime for simpleProc by 3.7%,
illustrating that interfaces may not reduce verification time
for very simple designs. The runtime savings are much higher
for cacheProc and cacheProcTSO because they use the
AtomicMemory interface to abstract L1Hier. L1Hier is
relatively detailed when compared to AtomicMemory, so
verification using AtomicMemory takes much less time.
2) RVWMO Results: Figure 13 shows RealityCheck’s
runtimes for 98 RVWMO litmus tests on our 3 RVWMO
microarchitectures, both with and without interfaces. These
results use a bound of up to 11 operations per module. The
RVWMO litmus tests used are generated using an automated
litmus test synthesis tool [19]. The litmus tests we use for
RVWMO are the set of litmus tests up to 6 instructions long
generated by this tool for the RVWMO MCM.
As Figure 13 shows, RealityCheck verifies each litmus
test in all 6 configurations in under 4 minutes per test.
The maximum time per test is lower under RVWMO than
SC or TSO because our largest RVWMO litmus test is
6 instructions long (compared to e.g. the n3 TSO litmus
test which has 9 instructions). Similar to the SC and TSO
microarchitectures, interfaces reduce verification time by 32.1%
for cacheProcRISCV and 30.0% for heteroProcRISCV,
while increasing runtime by 1.0% for simpleProcRISCV.
The use of interfaces for abstraction depends on the im-
plementations of those interfaces being verified against the
interfaces. We present results on those next.
C. Interface Verification
We conducted interface verification of three pipelines
(inOrderCore, sbCore, and rvwmoCore) against their
respective interfaces. Table II shows interface verification
times for these pipelines (bound of 15). Interface verification
of rvwmoCore takes longer than interface verification for
the other two pipelines because the RISC-V pipeline is
substantially more complicated. Nevertheless, its interface
verification completes in 42 minutes.
We also verified the L1Hier memory hierarchy against
AtomicMemory. Figure 14 shows interface verification run-
time for L1Hier against AtomicMemory with varying
bounds. MemHier interface verification runtimes at higher
bounds are significantly larger than litmus test runtimes. For
instance, interface verification of L1Hier at a bound of 10
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takes over 14 hours. This is not surprising, as interface verifi-
cation checks the implementation for all possible combinations
of operations up to the user-specified bound. So for example,
if verifying L1Hier against AtomicMemory with a bound
of 10, one is checking all possible combinations of up to 10
transactions. This is essentially verifying all possible “programs”
(from the perspective of memory) of up to 10 operations, which
is far more than the possible memory transaction combinations
that could result from a single litmus test.
The high runtimes for interface verification of MemHier
are not as big an issue as they may initially seem. As
Section VIII-D below shows, bugs in implementations which
cause them to not match their interfaces are detectable at
lower bounds, and are found quickly even at higher bounds.
Thus, even if interface verification has not terminated, if it
does not find a bug quickly, the design is likely to be correct.
Furthermore, interface verification can be run in parallel with
both litmus test verification and with interface verification of
other modules, making it well placed to take advantage of large
compute clusters. Finally, interface verification of a module
only needs to be run once, not once per litmus test. As the
number of litmus tests run increases, the time saved from
using interfaces for abstraction will draw closer to the time
for interface verification.
D. Bug Finding
To test how quickly interface verification can find bugs, we
performed three case studies where we added a bug to the
implementation of a component and then verified it against its
interface. The first bug we added was to remove the axiom in
L1Hier’s L1 cache which ensured that it could only have one
value for a given address at any time. RealityCheck discovered
this bug when verifying L1Hier against AtomicMemory at
a bound of 3 in less than a second. Even when the bound was
increased to 15, RealityCheck still found the bug in under 2
minutes. The second bug we added was to remove the axiom
in L1Hier’s L1 cache which prevented it from dropping dirty
values without writing them back. RealityCheck discovered this
bug during interface verification at a bound of 4 in less than
a second. Once again, even when the bound was increased to
15 operations, RealityCheck still caught the bug in less than 2
minutes. The final bug we added was to try and verify sbCore
against inOrderInt. This should fail because inOrderInt
requires program order to be preserved, while sbCore relaxes
write-read ordering. RealityCheck duly discovered the bug at
a bound of 15 in under a second.
IX. RELATED WORK
There has been much work on formal MCM specifications
of hardware ISAs in recent years [2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 13, 20,
25, 26, 28, 32, 35, 38]. There has also been much work
on MCM verification, using a variety of approaches. Fractal
coherence [36] uses a hierarchical design for coherence
protocols to enable verifiability, but does not address MCM
verification as a whole. Dynamic approaches like TSOTool [12]
and DVMC [24] are incomplete in that they do not check all
possible executions of the programs they are verifying. DVMC
does modularise the system into the pipeline and coherence
protocol, but no further. Furthermore, dynamic approaches
require an implementation to exist. This is in contrast to
RealityCheck, which can be used for early-stage design-time
verification before RTL is written.
Automated formal approaches for hardware MCM verifi-
cation consist of the Check suite [17, 18, 22, 23, 32] and
PipeProof [21]. The Check suite can automatically examine all
possible executions of a litmus test on a microarchitecture
to formally verify whether the test is observable on the
microarchitectural specification. Meanwhile, PipeProof can
automatically prove microarchitectural MCM correctness across
all possible programs using an approach based on abstraction
refinement. Despite their successes, the Check suite and
PipeProof suffer from a lack of modularity that inhibits their
ability to be fully usable in a real-world design setting. Their
lack of modularity also encourages the writing of global axioms
that do not directly match the underlying hardware. In contrast,
RealityCheck supports modularity, hierarchy, and abstraction,
which enable independent verification of each component, scal-
able verification of the entire design, and make it impossible to
write global axioms. However, RealityCheck cannot guarantee
correctness across all possible programs. Nevertheless, we
believe that RealityCheck provides the basis for unbounded
MCM correctness proofs of modular specifications in future
work, just as litmus test-based verification approaches enabled
the development of PipeProof [21] for unbounded proofs of
flat microarchitectural specifications.
The only prior hardware MCM verification work that
supports modularity, hierarchy, and abstraction is Kami [6, 33].
While Kami can prove correctness across all possible programs,
these proofs must be written manually in a Coq framework,
a setup which is not suitable for typical computer architects.
In contrast, RealityCheck is an automated tool that is easy to
use while still providing modularity, hierarchy, and abstraction,
though it cannot prove correctness across all possible programs.
Coppelia [37] searches for hardware security exploits by
generating a C++ class hierarchy from processor Verilog and
conducting backward symbolic execution on it. However, unlike
RealityCheck, it evaluates the entire processor at once, and it
does not conduct MCM verification.
X. CONCLUSION
Modern processors are complex parallel systems which
incorporate components built by many different teams, and they
require stringent MCM verification to ensure their correctness.
In order to work with the distributed nature of the hardware
design process, specification and verification of orderings
enforced by hardware components would ideally be modular.
However, all prior automated formal hardware MCM verifica-
tion approaches provide no support for modularity, making it
hard for them to be used in real-world design settings.
In this paper we present RealityCheck, the first methodology
and tool for automated formal MCM verification of modular
hardware design specifications. RealityCheck provides support
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in its novel specification language µspec++ for modularity,
hierarchy, and abstraction. This allows users to encapsulate
orderings enforced by a component into modules which can
be composed with each other to create larger modules. Each
component can be verified against its interface specification
independently of the rest of the system, and regardless of
whether the rest of the design specification exists. Verification
of the entire design can be split into multiple smaller verifica-
tion problems, allowing verification to scale. We implement
RealityCheck as an automated tool and show that it is capable
of verifying hardware designs across a range of litmus tests,
and that it can detect bugs extremely quickly. In summary,
RealityCheck is a significant step forward on the road to fully
verifying today’s heterogeneously parallel SoCs.
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